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Several salient moral issues surface vis-a-vis the AIDS problem. The
intent of this article is to stimulate discussion by posing questions of a
significant nature for hospitals, their personnel and constituencies. An
attempt will be made to answer these questions within a (hopefully)
coherent and consistent ethical framework, in order that a "scaffolding"
might be developed for further debate and refinement.
Before doing so, a few remarks must be made concerning the distinction
between legality and morality. Law is basically an abstraction from the
morality of a given group of people and , therefore, laws necessarily have
some moral underpinning and rationale. Nonetheless, there are differences
between the two which are pertinent to the discussion.
Most laws deal with what is obligatory, particularly with obligations
which are coupled with punishment and / or reparations of some sort.
Although ethical theory inquires into the reasonable grounds for the
justification of these legal obligations, it also deals with what is
supererogatory, i.e., with actions which are praiseworthy to do, but not
blameworthy not to do. 1 This distinction is particularly relevant to an
ostensibly pluralistic and "secular" society. Legal obligations are binding
on all citizens, regardless of specific religious and moral beliefs. Although
an individual, in good conscience, may choose to disobey a positive law,
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the state may still exert its right to compel obedience and to levy
punishment. The realm of the supererogatory, however, is often viewed as
the province of individual, voluntary religious perspectives. We like to
keep the heroic and saintly free from compulsion and punishment, even if
we admire it exceedingly.
It is also not too great a caricature of the law, ancient and modern, to say
that it deals primarily with negatives, with "Thou shalt nots", while it is
often the case that religious morality, for example, is full of positive
commandments - to "go the second mile", etc.
In our lived moral experience, it is often hard to disentangle these
distinctions , especially since our culture rests historically on many of the
value assumptions of"ludeo-Christianity." The common moral assumptions of the "everyday person" are willy-nilly the inheritance of this
tradition, and this fact ' contributes to much of the confusion a"nd
vehemence of contemporary moral debates. This is particularly
problematic for religious hospitals, which must respect secular laws and
"rights" while at the same time remaining faithful to their heritages. It is
tempting to short-cut moral debate by referring exclusively to the
requirements of the law - to merely prudential considerations often
phrased in terms like "What will happen to me l us ifI l we do l don't do such
and such?" It is, however, possible that courts will increasingly look to
medical experts for advice on matters as socially explosive and as
empirically confusing as AIDS, thus putting medical institutions in the
role of providing reasonable justification for such policies, whether or not
they want to be in such a role.
It may be helpful to discuss AIDS from the standpoint of responsibility
and role. Such a framework may be able to clarify some problems
surrounding the distinction previously made between obligations binding
on all citizens of a pluralistic society and those moral values which free
citizens might voluntarily choose for themselves. The former may be called
"natural law I social contract" ethics, and the latter religious ethics. 2
This article will explore three role-specific areas of responsibility: I) the
responsibility of citizens, government and the afflicted; 2) the
responsibility of hospital administration, specifically, of a religious
hospital and 3) the responsibility of the physician I researcher and of other
hospital personnel. There are obviously many overlaps here. This very fact
reinforces the agony of the dilemma. Much of the "dilemma" aspect of the
current AIDS debate comes from tensions inherent in these roles. Much of
morality is, in fact, role-specific, and universal only with regard to the
universal aspects of that role. 3 Such role-conditioned responsibilities may
differ and even clash with each other. But looking at the problem through
the "lens" of responsibility and role may help to shed some light on, and
bring some order to, a very urgent and perplexing problem.
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Responsibility of Citizens, Government and the Afflicted
It is somewhat odd , no doubt, to speak of the responsibility of the
afflicted in a hospital context. Yet this particular area is hotly debated
among the public, and the attitude of the public will put considerable
pressure on politics and law. It may not prove to be irrelevant to those in
positions of power within medical institutions, either.
I t is sometimes assumed, by people acting solely out of an understanding
of the secular, social contract view, that citizens are basically bearers of
negative rights vis-a-vis the state. That is to say, the state "owes" them
freedom from undue interference of various kinds. There is considerable
truth to this position. The eminent philosopher, John Rawls, elucidates
one of the principles of a liberal social order, based on social contract
theory, as "maximum liberty compatible with like liberty for all."4 The key
problem, of course, is spelling out what is meant by "compatible,"
especially when we are dealing with AIDS . Though we can make a strong
case that the presumption of the social contract is for individual freedom
(i.e., the state bears the burden of proof in reducing freedom), this freedom
cannot, obviously, be absolute. The state reserves the right to conscript
persons for military service in the event of grave threat to the state, e.g., in
wartime. The state will declare certain of an individual's rights to freedom
forfeit should they prove to be incompatible with others, e.g., when that
individual harms people. Certainly the state has the right, and has exerted
the right historically, to abrogate personal rights in the event of massive
social harm, such as an epidemic, through such measures as involuntary
quarantine and isolation. 5
AIDS may come to present a severe enough threat to public well-being
to warrant measures such as mandatory testing and perhaps quarantine /
isolation as well. It is important, however, that certain moral safeguards be
met should such a situation arise.
The general moral obligation to "do no harm", taken, in the case of
AIDS, in the even stronger sense of "do not kill", can, by even the strongest
variety of legal positivism and secularism, be considered a fundamental
negative of the natural law. In the thought of H. L. A. Hart, a late, great
legal scholar, it can be considered afunctional requisite for all societies,
irrespective of religious or quasi-religious orientation. 6
The transmission of the AIDS virus is obviously, on the basis of
consequences. an act of harm, whether or not it is willfully intended. As
such it can be considered grounds for the abrogation of specific rights to
freedom, which may include such measures as quarantine / isolation and
mandatory testing.

Testing
Having AIDS and knowing it, and refraining from telling an "innocent"
party beforehand can easily be construed as an act of murder, (short of
psychotic depression, or the sort of heroic, voluntary experimentation
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which some medical researchers might perform upon themselves in order
to try to develop a cure).
Accordingly, from the standpoint of the social consequences of
transmitting the virus, a case can be made for mandatory testing.
Ignorance normally exonerates. Willful ignorance, as Aristotle argued,
does not. One cannot morally refuse to know whether or not one carries
the disease when transmission can result in serious injury or death.
The last point brings us to a volatile issue in the public debate, one which
is fraught with paranoia and misunderstanding. It is an unfortunate fact
that, in this country at least, "high-risk" populations for AIDS are also
outcast populations socially. The fact that the disease has now spread
beyond homosexual and drug-abuse populations has done little to stop
paranoia on the part of these groups, and has probably exacerbated the
problems of their outcast status. Yet the paronoia of these specific
populations, however justifiable, must not be allowed to cloud the issue of
what measures are necessary to stop a possible epidemic. There is no right
to spread lethal disease. There are, however, sound grounds for arguing
that "high risk" groups ought not to be singled out for special measures,
such as mandatory testing.
Internationally, the disease is not at all confined to these populations,
nor can it be proven to have originated in them. Evidence suggests that it is
no longer confined to these groups in this country.7 Since it is not
exclusively a disease "belonging" to these groups, there is no ground for
isolating these groups for testing. At what point the demographics of the
disease will force the issue of universal, mandatory testing is difficult to
say,8 but its justifiability, in theory, is not.
I t is, of course, the case that testing is itself fraught with difficulties, such
as the long incubation period for the disease and questions concerning the
very reliability of the present tests, including the problems associated with
false positives. These complex empirical problems make it very difficult to
determine precisely at what point the presumption for individual freedom
might be justly abrogated. Yet these difficulties, however great, ought not
to be taken as arguments against universal, mandatory testing. It could be
argued, for example, that the threat of such testing would merely drive
people, particularly those in high-risk categories, "underground." This
could no doubt happen. But it is also highly probable that universal testing
would lessen the reticence of "high risk" groups to be tested, since it could
not be considered discriminatory.
The Issue of Quarantine/Isolation
What ought to happen if one is found to test positive? While AIDS is, of
course, an illness, its primary means of transmission, at this point, appears
to be sexual. This renders the issue of quarantine ( isolation extremely
problematic. It is rendered more problematic by empirical confusion, even
among experts, concerning the possibilities of the disease's transmission
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by other "involuntary" means - e.g., by salvia, mosquitoes, etc., and not
simply by transfusion or by other contact with infected blood or semen. 9
Even if we were to focus only on transmission by sexual means,
however, the issues of quarantine and / or isolation would not thereby be
done away with. Even if the infected person was an "innocent" recipient of
the disease, e.g., a hemophiliac, we would still be justified in considering
the objective danger of spreading the disease more important than the loss
of freedom which might ensue, even to an "innocently" infected person.
Can we depend upon voluntary abstinence or upon voluntary use of
condoms? May we presume that a carrier is honest in telling sex partners
he / she is infected? Here we have a "human nature" assumption of the first
magnitude at work . Even those claiming fidelity for five years or 10ngeriO
have been known to fool or to be fooled , have they not? Everyone today is
at some risk.
For the above reasons, the claim of some infected sufferers to have a
handicapping condition analogous, say, to being confined to a wheelchair
for non-contagious reasons, is dubious in the extreme. I I And, if there
should prove to be other means of transmission than the (primarily)
sexual, the argument for isolation will become very compelling. In the light
of "human nature" and empirical uncertainty, prophylactic measures can
be defended, including segregation in hospitals.

Financial Responsibilities
Insurance executives have claimed that the life-style of persons presently
in high-risk groups for AIDS, produces risks analogous to those produced
by cigarette smoking: if claims can be adjusted or refunded for this, why
not for AIDS?12 This problem raises questions not only of a financial, but
also of a deep philosophical nature. They are not irrelevant questions for
hospitals, of course.
Insurance industries agree that adults are responsible for their behavior,
especially for their sexual behavior! They also tend to argue that certain
forms of sexual activity constitute high risk behavior; hence they feel
justified in selectively screening these applicants for insurance. The
argument , on the face of it, is a strong one. It is difficult to ascertain what
arguments justify compelling private companies to pay for the illnesses of
persons who persist in high risk behavior.
The case for government intervention is a more subtle one. One could
argue that government has a responsibility to pay for accidental diseases
and events befalling innocent persons, but the sexual and drug-abuse
modes of transmission for this disease may cause it to fall into a
"borderline" area.13 It is also the case that the "cost-benefits" analysis
which large governmental agencies tend to follow will often favor
prevention over cure or treatment. That is to say, in the case of AIDS tax
dollars would most probably be maximized by screening (testing) and by
instituting various methods of stopping the transmission of the disease
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than by treating those already affected. Such is the type of reasoning that
causes some to question the enormous expense of AZT in the treatment of
apparently hopeless cases.
At any rate, failure of private or governmental agencies to pay for these
unfortunate sufferers poses urgent dilemmas for hospitals, particularly for
those claiming allegiance to religious values. The care for persons
irrespective of causes and costs is often a religious ideal. But it is also
obvious that hospitals might not be able to carry this burden alone.
Hospitals may have to pool resources in order to deal with the problem of
AIDS, while at the same time lobbying government for greater financial
support. Such pooling may include, for example, the building of
sanitariums in key geographical areas.
Responsibilities of Administrators of a Christian Hospital
The public debate concerning the personal responsibility of the sufferer
may inevitably prove to be a difficult, but necessary, moral issue for a
hospital to discuss. Obviously, hospitals provide care to the sick,
regardless of etiological or causal questions concerning the illness or
injury. This is even more the case for an institution grounded in religious
values, such as grace, forgiveness, unconditional love, etc. (It will not be
argued here why these theological ideas may coincide with determinism
and thus weaken arguments concerning the culpability of sufferers).
Thus, with regard to a religious hospital's moral obligation to the
indigent in general, and to some AIDS sufferers in particular, a religious
institution may not recognize the obligation/ supererogation distinction
that a more secular hospital might prefer. The case for the outcast,
regardless of cause, is, in light of the Bible a moral obligation, and not a
non-required but nice thing to do.
Thus, prima jacie, a religious institution's unconditional obligation to
the sick could be seen to run counter to some aforementioned views
concerning patient/ sufferer responsibility. And, in the extreme, an
attitude of unconditional caring such as this could financially destabilize,
and ultimately destroy a hospital, particularly if these measures are not
concerted with or shared with other hospitals and caring institutions.
The problem is that institutions have responsibilities to their
constituents to survive - certainly not at any moral cost, but perhaps at a
great deal of cost. In addition to the obvious burden of direct financial
costs raised by AIDS, there are public relations costs as well. Lawyers for
fired AIDS employees have argued that hospitals are only interested in
what the public will think.14 This argument has some truth to it, but is
reductionistic in the extreme. It is not unusual or immoral for an
institution to delicately balance its public relations with the issues of
employee or patient "rights." While it is true that the public suffers from a
great deal of misinformation concerning AIDS, especially concerning its
transmission, there is even conflicting information among experts. And
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although truth and education are obviously parts of what any hospital
stands for, the hospital's position, in light of empirical uncertainty, is very
problematic.
If there is absolutely no danger of ("accidental") transmission of AIDS,
then there is real discrimination if infected employees are fired or
reassigned. Few experts, however, would argue that there is absolutely no
danger of such transmission. 15 Given this slight empirical possibility of
harm, intentional or not, it follows from what has been argued previously,
that mandatory testing of employees and patients is warranted, and
perhaps segregation and / or dismissal as well. An extreme prophylaxis,
until some coherence can be brought to the empirical dimensions of this
problem, is good for the society and "good PR", both in a moral and in an
effective sense.
An institution, by its very nature, must be utilitarian in character. I.t
must coolly weight the facts, including financial costs and public relations,
in the balances with issues such as the "rights" of patients and employees. If
the hospital were empirically convinced that an employee or patient
infected with the virus posed no threat to the health of others, it would still
have to weigh this truth in the balances with the costs of public reaction.
This is utilitarianism's "Achilles heel" - that it justifies itself in hanging an
innocent man in order to stop a riot. 16
The situation becomes ever murkier with threats of expensive lawsuits
by "handicapped" employees. That is why a hospital has a responsibility to
educate the public concerning the logical difference between a handicap
and a CONTAGIOUS disease.
One final comment for hospital management. It is not beyond
possibility that there might come a time when care for AIDS patients
becomes so financially prohibitive that the resultant competition for
scarce resources may make the issue of personal responsibility a selection
factor for an otherwise unconditionally caring institution. Those familiar
with the "lifeboat ethics" game will remember that culpability is often
selected as a criterion for allocation or non-allocation of scarce resources.
I t is therefore not inconceivable that, should this disease become a massive
epidemic, a philosophical conflict between the ideas of personal
responsibility and unconditional caring will be forced. It will not be pretty
or easy. And though it is too "abstract" for many, its "resolution" will be a
logical necessity before any clarity can be given to the question of what
"ought" to be done.
Employee Obligations: Doctor-Patient Confidentiality

The literature on AIDS shows a growing emphasis on confidentiality in
the doctor-patient relationship. Voluntary tests and counseling are
advocated by almost all relevant institutions but the insurance agencies. 17
There is a great problem here. Historically, the doctor-patient
relationship has been built, of course, on trust and confidentiality. These
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values, and their underlying abstract norms of truth-telling and promisekeeping have often been used to counter utilitarian claims to use the one or
the few for the sake of the many. In most cases, the idea that the physician
is directly or primarily responsible to the patient, and only secondarily
responsible to the society or to scientific advancement, is a laudable one,
and one with great presence in historic codes of medical ethics. 18 It is also
the case that a disclosure of a patient's disease status often brings social
stigmatization and loss of financial security. For these reasons, ethicists
have written to the effect that the labeling of the sick is justified only to the
extent that such labels conduce to access, by the sufferer, to special
resources and privileges. 19
These historic principles are good presumptions but do not apply
completely to AIDS . AIDS is an illness involving triadic relationships: the
physician, patient and others are involved (e.g., sex partners and, perhaps
various financial institutions). There has been a history of government and
hospital-supported contact-tracing with regard to other venereal diseases,
and AIDS ought not to be an exception.20
Consequentialist moral arguments (i.e., those arguments of a nonreligious nature)21 usually conclude that the important norms of promisekeeping and truth-telling, which underlie not only medical relationships,
but the very ability of societies to function at all are, while stringent, not
nearly as stringent as the norm to avoid the injury / death of other persons.
Only a deontological fanatic 22 could think that confidentiality is more
important, in conflict-of-rule situations, than avoiding harm.
The fact that confidentiality has been abrogated in other cases regarding
sexually transmitted diseases attests to the tremendous political lobbying
power of groups presently afflicted, and not to the moral legitimacy of
such an attitude vis-a-vis the social contact.
Disclosure by Employees?
According to one professor of health law, the obligation of employees to
disclose disease-carrying status would be binding if there were possible
harm of transmission. 23 Here, truth-telling would be in tandem with
non-maleficence (not harming). A patient's right to informed consent of
this kind is only valid where the possibility of harm is established.
Empirically, transmission through medical care and surgery is a very
difficult problem. It would be better to err on the side of disclosure than to
run the risk, however small, not only of transmission of infection, but also
of what one lawyer projects as litigated damages in the tens of millions of
dollars, should a patient receive the disease from a hospital employee. 24
Mandatory testing of employees and patients would, of course, disclose
an employee's or a patient's illness to at least certain members of hospital
management. Management would, in the case of the infected employee or
patient, have to decide among various options: to do nothing and hope for
the best; to dismiss or isolate the employee or patient; or perhaps to allow
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the patient or employee to continue their relationships, provided that the
infected party disclose his or her status to the other, and that the noninfected party consent.
Again, management is forced into the position of having to prioritize
various harms. It should keep in mind, however, that the presumption "do
no harm" is most stringent in the form of causing death. The harms of
stigma and joblessness, while obviously grievous, are not as important as
not killing. (See addendum) .
The recent decision of the Center for Disease Control to oppose
mandatory tests, while at the same time endorsing contact tracing, shows
the paradoxes resultant from failing to weight the norms correctly.25
A Problem for the Medical Researcher

One other position of the CDC seems morally indefensible on the basis
of the admittedly sketchy ethical framework proposed. This is the problem
of the anony mous testing of blood samples (as opposed to confidential
testing). A researcher involved in the study contended that it would have
been unethical to test "identified" blood samples without permission. Here
informed consent is said to outweigh what one researcher called "the only
downside" to the experiment - that patients would not know they were
positive. 26
This type of non-consequential reasoning, which implies that
anonymity is more important than the spread of death, is certainly difficult
to defend. Consequentialists argue that we are responsible for sins of
omission as well as for sins of commission. 27 In this respect the researchers
could be found morally guilty of complicity in homicide.
It is thus an interesting question (one occurring often with regard to
experimental designs using placebos) whether or not the above-mentioned
statistical experiment amounts to withholding known effective treatment
(if drugs like AZT can be considered at all efficacious).28
Ought an Employee be Forced to Work with AIDS Sufferers?

Self-sacrifice is, from a religious perspective, of the nighest moral order.
"Secular" societies also give lip-service to it. Only in extreme situations can
it be considered obligatory to sacrifice oneself for another. It must,
according to social contact theory, be supererogatory and therefore purely
voluntary. The only exception is, possibly, wartime, when the perceived
threat to the body politic is so grave that the flower of the nation's youth
can be involuntarily conscripted and can possibly face death as a result. It
is hard to see a physician'S role vis-a-vis an AIDS patient as at all
analogous to a wartime situation. Even a massive epidemic would not be
analogous, since, at present, AIDS is a thoroughly lethal disease. Noone
can require self-sacrifice for hopeless cases.
Heroes and saints are admired by secularists and religionists alike for
running self-sacrificial risks. But no one can make this mandatory or
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obligatory. There would be no social contract if individuals were forced to
take these risks. The self-preservation of the individual is the reason for the
contract in the first place.
Since the Hippocratic oath, physicians have been seen to verge on
making the supererogatory the obligatory.29 But this must be a religious
(or quasi-religious) decision of the physician, one made without coercion.
One could argue that the highest religious value is self-sacrifice, but not
even a religious hospital could turn this into an obligation.30 Still, it may be
the case that a society that does not try to instill the moral values of risk
and self-sacrifice for the sake of others will not, in the end, be able even to
function at all.
Summary

AIDS may come to constitute a national emergency, in terms of lives
and dollars, of such magnitude that the normal presumptions for maximal
individual freedom can justly be abrogated . In light of both important
empirical certainties and uncertainties concerning its transmission,
universal mandatory tests and even subsequent isolation can be defended
as measures morally undertaken both by the state and by other relevant
institutions, such as hospitals.
Though issues of individual responsibility and culpability may
necessarily arise, particularly from a "secular" social-contract perspective,
a religious hospital, and individual religious employees bear a terrible
responsibility for these unfortunates. What happens to them, and who will
pay for them, is a problem that the religious conscience cannot shirk as
easily as the secular.
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